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PROVEN GUILTY: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE PENALTY-FREE WORLD OF POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING
GWENDOLYN CARROLL*
The phenomenon of exonerations of wrongfully convicted prisoners through
post-conviction DNA testing has received extensive and very positive media
coverage. However, post-conviction DNA testing, more often than not,
provides either inconclusive results or, in many cases, confirms the guilt of
the prisoner seeking testing. In addition, DNA testing is costly, time-
consuming, and provides an additional administrative burden on already
over-extended state criminal justice systems. Only one state in the country,
Missouri, has a statutory provision that sanctions petitioners who seek
guilt-confirming, post-conviction DNA tests. This Comment proposes and
evaluates four possible solutions to the problem of this unrecognized and
unnecessary burden on the justice system, and advocates for the adoption of
a system by which petitioners whose tests confirm guilt would be sanctioned
through the loss of good time credit, which is given to prisoners as a
reward for exemplary conduct in prison.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fairy tale-like story of the innocent man wrongly accused and
convicted of a crime, later freed through post-conviction DNA testing, is
told every week in magazines, newspaper comments, television shows, and
1 2
radio interviews.' However, there is a far more common story, one that
J.D. 2007, Northwestern University School of Law.
See, e.g., The Aftermath of Murder: Daughter of Victim, Daughter of Man Convicted in
Long-Ago Murder Clash Over His Fate, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2005, at A10;
Stephanie Booth, I Fight for Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners: Hundreds of Innocent Men
Have Been Locked Up for Violent Crimes They Didn't Commit, COSMOPOLITAN, Sept. 2005,
at 232; Frontline: What Jennifer Saw (PBS television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997); Stories of
the Innocence Project: Marvin Anderson's Nightmare (Court TV television broadcast 2004).
2 Angeia Rozas, Lawyers Drop Bid to Clear Man's Name: DNA Test Links Convicted
Rapist, CH1. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2003, at B2 (Assistant State's Attorney Mark Ertler said that "a
majority of the cases he has handled in which DNA testing is later requested have resulted in
positive matches. 'It's not unusual. You just don't hear about cases where the DNA
665
G WENDOLYN CARROLL
often goes untold. It is the story of the petitioner who spends years
lobbying the government, either with or without the assistance of an
innocence project attorney, to perform a post-conviction DNA test. This
petitioner absorbs hundreds of hours of an already overburdened state
prosecutor's time and puts the victim through the grief and pain of doubting
the resolution of her ordeal. At last the petitioner is granted the test, which
can cost as much as $5,000,3 and it seems that his struggle will be
vindicated. But this story does not have a fairy tale ending. Instead, the
results of the post-conviction DNA test confirm the guilt of the petitioner,
rather than proving his innocence.
Estimates on the percentage of cases in which post-conviction testing
confirms the petitioner's guilt range from "about half the cases" '4 to about
60% of cases5 in which testing "further implicate[s] the defendant."6 For
Assistant Cook County State's Attorney Mark Ertler, the numbers are
similarly sobering. In October 2005, Ertler had thirty pending petitions
from inmates seeking post-conviction DNA testing.7 In 2004, ten of
Ertler's testing petition cases had met resolution.8 Of those ten, none were
conclusively exculpatory. 9  Rather, two resulted in matches to the
petitioner's DNA,' ° confirming guilt." Each petition may take anywhere
confirms they're the right person convicted."').
3 Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New
Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1097, 1098 n.4 (2003).
4 Peter J. McQuillan, DNA News, (2005), http://www.innocenceproject.org/dnanews/
index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
5 The 60% statistic is also somewhat misleading. The implication of that statistic is that
40% of those granted post-conviction DNA testing are exonerated by those tests. However,
as Ertler's record indicates, testing results do not fall neatly into categories of "exculpatory"
and "guilt-confirming." Test results can, for any number of reasons, be inconclusive. For
example, if a sample is too small, it can be insufficient to positively identify the DNA
source. See infra note 140 for further explanation of inconclusive samples.
6 Stephanie Simon, DNA Tests for Inmates Debated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at A10.
"Further implication" of the petitioner is yielded by tests in which the tested DNA sample
matches the DNA of the petitioner.
7 Interview with Mark Ertler, Deputy Supervisor of the Special Litig. Unit for Cook




11 A study of the results of post-conviction DNA testing was conducted by the St. Louis
Circuit Attorney's Office (STLCAO) beginning in 2003. Robert Patrick, Review of DNA
Sets Very Few Free, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2005, at AI, A7-A8. As a part of
an initiative begun by Circuit Attorney Jennifer Joyce, the STLCAO reviewed 1,400 cases to
evaluate the potential usefulness of post-conviction DNA testing. Id. After reviewing
evidence and trial transcripts in those cases, the STLCAO determined that the testing of
DNA evidence could prove relevant in approximately 210 cases. Id. Of those 210 cases,
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from one year to many years to reach resolution, depending on the
evidentiary complications and peculiar circumstances of a particular case.12
While the stretched resources of prosecutors' offices are one serious
concern raised by the problem of post-conviction testing that confirms the
petitioner's guilt, 3 another far less quantifiable factor is the trauma
experienced by the victim. Reopening a case can be acutely stressful,
painful, and traumatic for the victims and families of victims.14 Jennifer
Joyce, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney, has witnessed the experience of
victims whose cases have been reopened by post-conviction testing
petitions: 15
[Joyce] personally counseled shaking, sobbing victims who were distraught to learn
that their traumas were being aired again. One victim, she said, became suicidal and
then vanished; her family has not heard from her for months. Another, a deaf elderly
woman, grew so despondent that her son has not been able to tell her the results of the
DNA test. Every time he raises the issue, she squeezes her eyes shut so she will not
be able to read his lips. DNA tests confirmed that she was raped by Kenneth Charron
in 1985, when she was 59. To get that confirmation, however, investigators had to
collect a swab of saliva from her so that they could analyze her DNA. They also had
to inquire about her sexual past, so they could be sure the semen found in her home
was not that of a consensual partner. The questioning sent the woman into such
depression that she's now on medication.
16
three people were freed based on the testing. Id. According to the review's coordinator,
Assistant Circuit Attorney Ed Postawko, "About seven people who claimed innocence were
proven guilty" by the testing. Id. Jackson County, the district encompassing Kansas City,
has had similar results. Ted Hunt, the chief trial assistant for the Kansas City prosecutor, has
said that "the five DNA tests done in old cases in Jackson County all confirmed the
defendant's guilt." Id.
12 Id.
13 See Simon, supra note 6, at A10 ("[St. Louis Circuit Attorney Jennifer] Joyce's staff
spent scores of hours and thousands of dollars on those [post-conviction DNA] tests.").
14 See generally Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV.
937, 965-66 ("A victim's contact with the criminal justice system may hinder him or her
from coming to grips with death, meaning, responsibility, and isolation in innumerable
ways.... To be of value to past victims of core crimes, victim's rights proposals ideally
ought to assist, rather than interfere with, the victim's resolution of the experience.").
15 See generally Cynthia Bryant, When One Man's DNA Is Another Man's Exonerating
Evidence: Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA
Samples to Post-conviction Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 113, 141-50 (2000)
(discussing the need for obtaining elimination samples from third parties who may have had
contact with the victim of a rape, and from whom a sample of DNA is necessary in order
eliminate the third party as the perpetrator of the crime). The same principle explains the
taking of a saliva swab from the victim of a crime-the victim's DNA, like that of the
consensual partner, must be sampled in order to eliminate it as the source of the DNA
gathered during the physical examination of the victim.
16 Simon, supra note 6, at A10.
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The concern of traumatizing a victim by seeking post-conviction DNA
testing 17 is echoed by Ertler, who notes that, "[The office of the state's
attorney] notifies the victims as a professional courtesy, but it is a horrible
process for them. Often, they have to come in and give a sample and have
to relive the process fifteen or twenty years after they thought they'd gotten
some resolution."' 8 An obvious response to any evocation of victim trauma
is that however terrible the post-conviction process may be for a victim, it is
outweighed by the potential harm of keeping an innocent person in prison.
However, if, as in the case of Kenneth Charon, the test only serves to
confirm the petitioner's guilt, the expense and pain of the post-conviction
petitioning process are entirely unnecessary and, this Comment will argue,
eminently avoidable.
In order to deter frivolous' 9 applications for post-conviction DNA
testing, this Comment proposes and assesses three alternative solutions, all
of which take the form of revisions or additions to state statutes that provide
for post-conviction DNA testing. The first proposed solution is the creation
of a more rigorous screening process for applications for post-conviction
DNA testing. The process would incorporate less subjective standards for
the determination of whether or not to grant a test. 20 Because state statutes
providing for post-conviction DNA testing are relatively new, 21 there is
some disparity in their structures and approaches to the problem of post-
conviction testing, specifically with regard to the necessary conditions that
17 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Robert Hovey, Supervisor of DNA Review Unit,
Cook County State's Attorney's Office, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 14, 2005) ("Anytime, particularly
when you're dealing with a sex offense, when you have a case that becomes active again,
that is something that is very stressful for the victim. Part of the healing process for a victim
or the family of a victim is to have some closure, and reopening the case is extremely hard
on them.").
18 Interview with Mark Ertler, supra note 7.
19 This Comment will refer to "frivolous" petitions as those that result in tests that
confirm the defendant's guilt. The term "frivolous," as used in this Comment, does not carry
the same connotations of triviality or silliness as it does in common language use. This term
is derived from the statutory language that penalizes the filing of petitions without
substantial justification or for the purposes of harassment. See infra note 184 and
accompanying text.
20 See infra Section IV.
21 In 1999, only fifteen states had provisions for the granting of new trials on the basis of
post-conviction testing, and a federal provision for such testing was only passed into law in
2004. Justice for All Act of 2004, H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004); OFF. OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING REQUESTS 2 (1999) [hereinafter POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING]. As of June
2005, thirty-nine states had statutes providing for such tests. Seth Axelrad & Juliana Russo,




a petitioner must meet in order to receive a test. 22 The development of more
stringent and uniform screening standards could potentially reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, the problem of frivolous petitioning.
However, this proposal has four serious flaws. First, the established
screening process is already fairly comprehensive in most states and, if not
explicitly articulated in the statutory description of the process, is described
in somewhat greater detail in the state courts' interpretations of the
statutes.2 3  Second, subjectivity of evaluation may very well be an
inescapable element in the evaluation process for post-conviction testing
petitions.24 Third, a more stringent application process carries the risk of
failing to exonerate an innocent person for failure to meet a heavier
evidentiary burden.25  Fourth, even if a more rigorous screening process
could be effectuated, it would not necessarily reduce the number of
applications; instead, it would simply reduce the number of those
petitioners who are ultimately granted tests.26 Thus, a proposal that places
the onus on the courts and attorneys of reducing the burden on courts and
attorneys is fundamentally misguided. In order to be effective, the proposal
must deter guilty petitioners from seeking testing in the first place, while
not discouraging innocent petitioners.
The second proposal would shift the burden of payment for the costs
of testing to the petitioner, rather than the state. Virtually every state that
provides for post-conviction testing, as it now stands, funds the testing for
indigent petitioners, and requires only solvent petitioners to advance the
funding for the test.27 If states were to require a petitioner to advance some,
if not all, of the cost of the test, that condition might deter petitioners who
know they are guilty from seeking testing. However, as with the first
proposal, there are problems with this idea. First, indigent petitioners might
be unfairly excluded, thus barring potentially innocent inmates from
obtaining testing. Second, mandatory testing payments may invoke
Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns. Finally, payment may not
provide a sufficiently effective screen of the guilty petitioners.
The third proposal follows Missouri's statutory model. The Missouri
law that provides for post-conviction testing also levies specific penalties
against petitioners who seek testing only to have the results confirm their
22 See infra Section IV.C.
23 See infra Section III.C.
24 See infra id.
25 See infra id.
26 See infra id.
27 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 2 1.
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guilt. 28 Not only is that person then liable for the costs of the test,29 but he
is also subject to sanction under a different law that mandates that sixty
days be added to the sentence of any person who files a frivolous claim
with the court.3° Missouri is the only state that has incorporated into its
post-conviction statute a provision that renders such a sanction mandatory
in the case of guilt-confirming tests.
31
The third proposal urges the adoption of the Missouri statutory
framework, specifically the incorporation of a sentence extension for those
petitioners whose tests confirm their guilt. This Comment proposes that the
sentence extensions be effected through the use of good time penalties.
Every state that has a provision for post-conviction DNA testing also has a
system of awarding "good time credits." Good time credits are reductions
in length of the prisoner's sentence that may be granted for various forms of
good behavior, and may be deducted for rules violations and, in some
states, for the filing of frivolous claims with the court.32 Although Missouri
is the first and only state to levy sentencing sanctions against those
petitioners whose tests confirm their guilt, no state has used good time
penalties as the sanctioning mechanism in post-conviction testing cases.
This Comment's third proposal relies on the logic of the Missouri statute,
that petitioners who seek tests only to have the tests confirm their guilt
should be subject to sentencing sanctions, but suggests implementing the
existing good time credit sanctioning structure as a means of penalizing
guilty petitioners.
A mandatory sanction of a deduction of good time credits would not
harm those who are innocent and have been wrongfully convicted. To the
contrary, its function as a deterrent would reduce the burden on the courts,
on prosecutors, and on innocence project attorneys. This would, in turn,
free up the resources of money and time, which could then be allocated to
those who truly are innocent and who will benefit from the exculpatory
evidence that can be provided by post-conviction DNA testing. The
innocent have nothing to lose by pursuing a post-conviction DNA testing
petition. But under the status quo, neither do the guilty, and the result is the
unnecessary and preventable burdening of an already over-burdened
28 Mo. REV. STAT. § 650.055 (2006).
29 Id.
30 Id. § 217.262.
31 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21.
32 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.7(I)(1) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504
(2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2006); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 422.285, 422.287 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 590.01-.06 (2006); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 547.035, 650.055.
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criminal justice system. This proposal will not only prevent needless
trauma to the victims and reduce the waste of resources, it will facilitate the
just resolution of the cases of both the guilty and the innocent.
Section II of this Comment provides a general factual background on
the process of post-conviction DNA testing and the goals of innocence
projects nationwide, specifically those of the Cardozo School of Law's
Innocence Project as a representative model of DNA-testing-focused
projects. 33 Section III describes the screening process of post-conviction
DNA testing applications. This section discusses the innocence projects'
(both Cardozo's and other similar projects) application screening process
used in selecting the petitioners for whom they will work as advocates, 34 the
courts' interpretations of post-conviction DNA testing statutes, 35 and the
screening process for re-testing as described in statutes and common law.36
Section IV describes a categorization method for reviewing testing
applications, proposes a framework of analysis for post-conviction testing
petitions, and discusses the potential disadvantages of the proposed
method.37 Section V examines the issue of payment for testing costs, and
suggests the possibility of requiring petitioners to advance the costs of the
testing until and if they are exonerated by the results. 38 Section VI surveys
the existing state statutory structure for the penalization of frivolous
petitions, describes the Missouri statutory model, and discusses the costs
and benefits of applying the forfeiture of good time credits as a sanction
against those whose post-conviction DNA tests confirm their guilt.
39
II. POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND THE INNOCENCE PROJECT
The Innocence Project and many similar organizations throughout the
country have received widespread national media coverage, both in the
popular media and the academic community, and have brought a great deal
of public attention to the phenomenon of wrongfully convicted, and
sometimes wrongfully executed, prisoners.40  Attempts to exonerate the
33 See infra Section II.
34 See infra Section III.B.
" See infra id.
36 See infra Section III.C.
37 See infra Section IV.
38 See infra Section V.
39 See infra Section VI.
40 See, e.g., Diane Kanon, Will the Truth Set Them Free? No, But the Lab Might.
Statutory Responses to Advancements in DNA Technology, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 467 (2002);
Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at




wrongfully convicted take many forms, from investigating potentially false
confessions to locating previously unidentified witnesses.4' However, post-
conviction DNA testing can provide by far the most concrete and
imminently verifiable demonstration of innocence.42 Although DNA
evidence is by no means infallible,43 "the progress in the technology of
DNA testing which occurred in the 1990s now makes it possible to obtain
conclusive results in cases in which previous testing provided inconclusive
results."44 The Innocence Project, based at Cardozo Law School, was one
of the first and is by far one of the most high-profile legal clinics of its
kind.45 Its founders, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, opened the clinic in
1992, and have since handled many of the high-profile cases discussed in
the national media, including the five men convicted and later exonerated in
the Central Park Jogger case.46 In total, the work of the Innocence Project
has brought about 163 exonerations.47  The Innocence Project only deals
with cases of "actual innocence" in which "post-conviction DNA testing of
evidence can yield conclusive proof of innocence." 4  The term "actual
innocence" is used to distinguish cases of wrongful conviction, in which a
defendant may have committed the crime but was convicted using evidence
that should have been excluded or for other procedurally invalid reasons,
from those in which prisoners are factually innocent of the crimes for which
they are serving prison sentences. 49 Factually innocent defendants did not
41 Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks & Tara Shulman, The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase:
Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. REV.
413, 431 n.3 (2002).
42 Id.; see also The Innocence Project-About Us, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about/index.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2007) (explaining that the Project is able only to accept
applicants for whom DNA testing has the potential to provide conclusive proof of
innocence).
43 Courts have recognized the fallibility of such evidence. In Schwartz v. State, "experts
acknowledged that DNA testing could produce a 'false negative,' where a DNA match is not
declared when one in fact exists. Contradictory expert testimony was offered concerning
whether a 'false positive,' could result where the wrong individual is identified as the
contributor of the DNA sample." Anna M. Franceschelli, Motions for Post-conviction DNA
Testing: Determining the Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP U.L.
REV. 243, 260 (2003) (quoting Schwartz v. State, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989)).
44 Id. at 244.
45 Hans Sherrer, Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer's Actual Innocence: When
Justice Goes Wrong and How to Make It Right, JUSTICE: DENIED 2001 (book review),
available at http://www.justicedenied.org/actualinnocencereview.htm.
46 Robert D. McFadden & Susan Saulny, A Crime Revisited. The Decision, 13 Years
Later, Official Reversal in Jogger Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at Al.
47 The Innocence Project-About Us, supra note 42.
48 Id.
49 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE
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commit the crimes of which they are accused. Wrongfully convicted
defendants may very well have committed the crimes of which they are
accused, but may also have been the victim of prosecutorial misconduct,
police brutality, or judicial error.5°
The Cardozo Innocence Project relies on volunteer law students and
attorneys to review hundreds of cases of people who say they have been
falsely convicted, usually of rape or murder, and, when appropriate, to
arrange for DNA tests that may support their claims of innocence.51
Although the Cardozo Innocence Project is one of the most prolific and
high-profile in the country, the concept of the innocence project was
actually originated by Centurion Ministries.52 Centurion Ministries was
[f]ounded in 1983 by former corporate executive turned Christian minister James
McCloskey... [and] only takes on cases where an inmate has been sentenced to
either life in prison or death, and where an inmate is completely factually innocent of
the crime for which he or she has been convicted.
53
Since the founding of Centurion Ministries, 54 similar projects have been
created throughout the country, many in association with law school
clinics.55 Although many of the exonerations reported in the popular media
have been achieved with the assistance of Cardozo Innocence Project
attorneys, state statutes opened the door for post-conviction testing petitions
to be filed pro se.56 Additionally, a number of state's attorney's offices
have initiated their own internal investigation and review of cases in which
DNA evidence played a role.
57
GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT xvi (2000).
50 Id.
51 Innocence Projects in the US, http://www.truthinjustice.org/ips.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2007).
52 Matthew D. Sharp, The Needfor An Innocence Network in Texas, 7 SCHOLAR 257, 260
(2005).
53 Id. (citing Centurion Ministries, http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/Freeform/
CenturionMinistries?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 21, 2007)).
54 Centurion Ministries, supra note 53.
55 Medwed, supra note 3, at 1098 n.4; see, e.g., Brooklyn Law School: Academic
Program (Second Look Clinic), http://www.brooklaw.edu/academic/courses/description/?
course=1 16 (last visited Apr. 21, 2007); California Western-California Innocence Project,
http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?nav=cip.asp&body=cip/home.asp (last visited Apr.
21, 2007); Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, http://www.exonerate.org/ (last visited Apr. 21,
2007).
56 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21.
57 For example, in 2003, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office in Chicago created a
DNA Review Unit charged with evaluating the necessity of post-conviction testing in
approximately one hundred cases. Jonathan Katz, County Announces DNA Unit, Nw. IND.
TIMES (Munster, Ind.), Feb. 20, 2003, available at http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2003/
02/20/news/local_illinois/64607d 11523a4b4b86256cd30005dc16.txt. Similar projects have
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DNA testing, both at the trial and post-conviction level, is primarily
used in cases of rape and murder because those are the cases in which
biological material is typically available and can be used to conclusively
place a defendant at the scene of the crime and as the violator of the
victim. 58 In 1987, British Scientist Dr. Alec J. Jeffreys used DNA for the
first time as forensic evidence to exclude a suspect in a rape case. 59 Later in
1987, DNA evidence was used to obtain a conviction in the United States,
when a Circuit Court in Florida convicted Tommy Lee Andres of rape after
DNA tests matched his DNA from a blood sample with that of semen traces
found in a rape victim. 60 Since that 1987 case, DNA evidence has become
widely used at the state level, and every U.S. jurisdiction now admits some
type of DNA evidence.6'
Post-conviction testing, which is sought by a petitioner after all other
avenues of appeal have been exhausted, is usually requested "not only in
cases in which DNA testing was never done, but also in cases in which a
newer, more sensitive technology may now be able to furnish a conclusive
answer."62  Technological improvements and the discovery of faulty or
inaccurate laboratory work "now make[] it possible to obtain conclusive
results in cases in which previous testing provided inconclusive results. 6 3
In 1996, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) issued a report profiling
twenty-eight men whose innocence had been proven using DNA technology
after they were convicted.64  In response to the report, then-Attomey
General Janet Reno "requested that the Institute establish a National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence to identify ways to maximize
the value of DNA in our criminal justice system." 65 Since the 1996 NIJ
report, thirty-nine states have passed into law statutes providing for post-
been created in prosecutor's offices across the country, including the Miami Dade State
Attorney's Office, see MiamiSAO.com-The Justice Project, http://www.miamisao.com/
services/justiceproject/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007), and the Office of the St. Louis
Circuit Attorney. See Telephone Interview with Edmund Postawko, Assistant Circuit
Attorney, Office of the St. Louis Circuit Attorney, in St. Louis, Mo. (November 14, 2006).
58 Franceschelli, supra note 43, at 243.
59 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL 4 (1996).
60 Franceschelli, supra note 43, at 246 (citing Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842-43
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
61 Id. at 243 (citing POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21, at 1).
62 Id. at 244 (quoting POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21, at 2).
63 Id. at 244.




conviction DNA testing,66 and in 2004, Congress passed the Justice for All
Act (JFAA) which made such testing available to those convicted of federal
67
crimes.
The history of forensic DNA evidence demonstrates the vital role
DNA can play in determining a defendant's innocence or guilt. However, it
should also always be remembered that "DNA alone does not prove guilt or
innocence, as DNA is only one piece of the evidence used in a criminal trial
against the defendant. 68  As Judge Keller, author of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals' majority opinion that denied petitioner Roy Criner a new
trial on the basis of post-conviction DNA testing results, explained, "'Just
like the absence of fingerprints right here [on this chair] doesn't show that I
didn't touch [the] chair,' the absence of a defendant's DNA at a crime scene
'can't show that he didn't do it.' ' 69 Because of the subtle nature of DNA
evidence's role in the evidentiary determination of guilt, and because courts
and attorneys have finite resources, applications for testing must be
selectively screened before being granted. The variety of approaches to the
application screening process is discussed below.
III. SCREENING POST-CONVICTION TESTING PETITIONS
A. OVERVIEW
Since there are a variety of methods by which a prisoner seeking post-
conviction DNA testing may obtain a test (pro se, with representation, or at
the prosecutor's behest), it is worthwhile to briefly explain the types of
testing application screening processes before discussing each in detail.
First, there are the screening processes imposed by state statutes and by
judicial interpretation of those statutes, which a petitioner seeking a court
grant of a test must pass. 70 These are relevant to petitioners who are pro se
as well as those who are represented, but who have not elected to have
testing of biological evidence performed by an independent, non-state
66 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21 (as of June 2005).
67 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004); Memorandum
from Sarah Tofte from the Innocence Project on JFAA Support for State Post-Conviction
DNA Testing Access Statutes to innocence network members (Dec. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/JFAA Memo.pdf.
68 Franceschelli, supra note 43, at 245.
69 Karen Christian, And the DNA Shall Set You Free: Issues Surrounding Post-conviction
DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2001) (citing
Interview by Ofra Bikel with Judge Sharon Keller, Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals
(transcript available at Frontline, The Case for Innocence, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/keller.html).
70 See, e.g., infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
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laboratory.71 Petitioners who are represented have had their petitions for
testing screened either by innocence project representatives, a screening
process which itself has a number of levels of scrutiny, or by the
prosecutors reevaluating the case.72
Those cases handled under the supervision and guidance of innocence
project and clinic representatives hopefully provide a best case scenario
study of the application screening process. 73  Many innocence project
clinics are primarily, if not exclusively, devoted to evaluating requests for
post-conviction DNA testing. Petitioners requesting retesting are asked to
fill out extensive questionnaires, and their cases are evaluated by law
students, faculty supervisors, and practicing attorneys. Memoranda
detailing each individual's specific case are assessed by committee before
the clinic agrees to provide representation.74 Yet, the figures concerning
post-conviction, testing-based acquittal rates cited in this Comment's
introduction indicate that about half of innocence project-assisted post-
conviction testing results in confirmations of guilt.75 Even though each of
those applications had been subjected to rigorous screening before being
accepted by the innocence projects, they still resulted in confirmations of
guilt. The following sections will describe in detail the screening processes
used by innocence projects and courts and described by state and federal
statutes.
It might seem that the evaluative process of prosecutor's offices would
be the most rigorous, but a number of factors make that untrue. First, many
of the petitions being evaluated by the prosecutor's office are petitions that
have already been filed with the court and have been brought to the
attention of the office only because a claim of actual innocence is being
made, creating a redundancy in the screening process.7 6 Second, the
prosecutor's office does not have the same breadth of resources devoted to
the evaluation of these petitions as an independent agency would.
For example, Illinois Assistant State's Attorney Robert Hovey, who
supervises the testing of genetic evidence for the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, employs two attorneys devoted to evaluating genetic
evidence, but those attorneys do not specialize in petitions for post-
conviction DNA testing.77 Instead, the attorneys' primary focus is the
71 Id.
72 See infra Section III.B.
73 Telephone Interview with Robert Hovey, supra note 17.
74 Medwed, supra note 3, at 1116-28.





evaluation of DNA evidence used at the trial, rather than post-conviction,
level. The standards used by Hovey's unit are fairly general and
subjective-if a case seems to have biological evidence suitable for testing,
then the case is pursued.78 A more detailed examination of the screening
process used by innocence projects demonstrates that despite their
comparative rigor, subjectivity and imperfection permeate the screening
process.
B. INNOCENCE PROJECTS' APPLICATION SCREENING PROCESS
In order to illustrate the screening process used by innocence projects,
this section will begin by describing a typical screening process, that of the
New England Innocence Project (NEIP). The NEIP does not have the
national recognition or extensive resources of the Cardozo Innocence
Project, and therefore provides a reasonable sample of the kind of screening
possible at innocence projects without the funding of the Cardozo Project.
The NEIP, sponsored by Goodwin Procter, LLP, combines the resources of
law school and law student support with sponsorship by a private law
firm.7 9 The NEIP has a multi-stage screening process, and the results of
each stage are independently evaluated by students, attorneys, or faculty
members. Because the NEIP has access to such a broad range of resources,
it provides a good representative example of innocence projects' screening
processes.
Jennifer Chunias, the Project's Executive Coordinator, estimates that
the NEIP annually receives around two hundred inquiries from inmates
seeking assistance. 80  Each applicant is required to fill out a ten-page
questionnaire detailing the available evidence, procedural history, and facts
and circumstances of her case.8' That questionnaire is reviewed by a
project staff attorney, who decides whether or not the petition has sufficient
merit to advance to the next stage in the screening process. 82 If the petition
meets the necessary criteria, it is assigned to a law student who works under
the supervision of an attorney and a faculty advisor.83 The student prepares
a case memo after reviewing the transcripts from the case, the prosecutor's
theory of the evidence, the appellate opinions, and the evidence.84 The case
78 Id.
79 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Chunias, Executive Coordinator, New England








memo is then submitted to the NEIP case committee, which is made up of
law professors and attorneys from the New England area. 85 Only after the
case committee approves the application does the process of trying to obtain
a test even begin. 86 Indeed, of the two hundred petitions that the NEIP
receives annually, Chunias estimates that less than 10% have actually
received committee approval.87
Inaccuracy and inadequacy of evaluation permeate even the rigors of
the innocence project screening process. In his description of the screening
process used by the innocence project at Brooklyn Law School, Daniel
Medwed recognizes the necessity of involving students in the process,
saying that "[r]egardless of how narrowly a project defines its intake
criteria, it will undoubtedly be overwhelmed with inquiries to a point far
beyond the capability of faculty supervisors alone to evaluate them
adequately., 88  Medwed also acknowledges the importance of instinct,
derived from experience and lengthy exposure to the criminal justice
process, in facilitating a person's ability to evaluate a claim:
As William Hellerstein often says, drawing on his forty years of criminal defense
practice, it is the amount of detail in the inmate's correspondence, the credibility
displayed during the prison interview, and a sense of "smell" that often convinces him
that a particular case warrants our services. One of the most fascinating aspects of the
innocence project case selection process concerns whether the fresh, eager nostrils of
clinic students are well-equipped to bear primary responsibility for this smell test.
89
Ultimately, the untested instincts of students play a crucial role in the case
selection process, and even with extensive supervision, like that employed
by the NEIP, the analysis of evidence, interviewing of the prisoner, and
evaluation of the totality of circumstances in a case are left in the untried
hands of a law student.90 The number of inconclusive and guilt-confirming
test results reflects the difficulty of discerning a meritorious petition and the
need for a more concrete method of evaluation.
C. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW SCREENING PROCESSES
States' procedural bases for an application for post-conviction DNA
testing, as the 1996 NIJ report observed, can be placed into three categories:
There are basically three different types of jurisdictions in which applications for




88 Medwed, supra note 3, at 1150.
89 Id. at 1127.
90 Id. at 1135-50.
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0 States such as New York and Illinois, which have statutes permitting
postconviction DNA testing.
0 Jurisdictions where, by case law, postconviction DNA testing requests are
permitted based on due process grounds.
0 Jurisdictions where newly discovered evidence claims are time barred and
applications are made for access to the evidence for the purpose of obtaining
executive clemency.
91
Although the threshold procedural requirements for seeking an application
can be readily categorized, "a review of various statutes reveals no
consensus as to the appropriate standards to allow post-conviction DNA
testing. 92  Statutes vary greatly in the degree of specificity given in the
standards necessary for a petitioner to be granted post-conviction testing.
Some require only that the testing of biological evidence has the potential to
indicate wrongful conviction, rather than factual innocence.93 Others have
lengthy lists of evidentiary requirements and mandate that the evidence
must demonstrate actual innocence,9 4 rather than inconclusive proof of guilt
or wrongful conviction. 95
Below is a list of the elements most commonly included in state
statutes.96 Some states incorporate as few as two of the review criteria,
97
91 POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21, at 48.
92 Franceschelli, supra note 43, at 249.
93 See Heidi C. Schmitt, Post-Conviction Remedies Involving the Use of DNA Evidence
to Exonerate Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners: Various Approaches Under Federal and State
Law, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1001, 1012 (2002) ("The states vary regarding the level of showing
that a prisoner must meet. For example, some states require that the testing must show
results 'materially relevant' to the defendant's claim of innocence, while others require DNA
testing to show a 'reasonable probability' that the verdict or sentence would have been more
favorable to the petitioner."); see, e.g., 2003 CONN. PUB. ACTS 242 ("[T]he Court shall order
DNA testing if it finds that: ... (1) A reasonable probability exists that the requested testing
will produce DNA results which would have altered the verdict or reduced the petitioner's
sentence if the results had been available at the prior proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction.").
94 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-1-411-18-1-416 (2006).
95 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21; see also Schmitt, supra note 93, at 1010.
96 These criteria were distilled from a comprehensive review of all thirty-nine states'
post-conviction DNA testing statutes. Although there are statutory anomalies (see the
Louisiana example discussed infra note 110 and accompanying text), this list represents the
most frequently occurring statutory elements.
97 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901-4902 (2006).
(d) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designed to protect the
state's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a determination that:
(1) The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and
(2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible results under the Idaho
20071
GWENDOLYN CARROLL
while some, such as New Jersey, incorporate, with the exception of the
admissibility requirement, every criterion listed below.
98
Evidentiary Criteria:
1. The evidence is still in existence and is in a condition that allows
DNA testing to be conducted;99
2. The evidence was not previously subjected to DNA testing; 100
3. If the evidence was previously tested, the results of any previous
DNA testing were inconclusive and subsequent scientific
developments would likely produce a definitive result;' 0 '
4. If the DNA evidence still exists, the results of testing would have
been admissible at trial;
10 2
5. The evidence to be tested was subject to a chain of custody
sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with,
replaced, or altered in any material respect. 1
03
a. More specifically: A law enforcement agency collected
biological evidence pertaining to the offense and retains "actual
or constructive possession" that allows for reliable DNA testing.
"Actual or constructive possession" means the biological
evidence is maintained or stored on the premises of the law
enforcement agency or at another location or facility under the
custody or control of the law enforcement agency.'
4
rules of evidence."). It should be noted that Idaho does have chain of custody and previous
testing requirements not explicitly listed in the "court shall allow the testing" section of the
statute.
Id. § 4902(d). It should be noted that Idaho does have chain of custody and previous testing
requirements not explicitly listed in the "court shall allow the testing" section of the statute.
98 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32A (West 2006).
99 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (2006); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9.1-11-12 (2006).
100 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405; GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-
9.1-11-12.
101 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 925.11, 943.3251 (2006).
102 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § § 19-4901-4902.
103 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-110, 53-1-214 (2006).
104 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-1-411-416 (2006).
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Review Criteria for Petition:
1. A reasonable probability exists that either:
a. The petitioner's verdict or sentence would have been more
favorable if the results of the DNA testing had been available at
the trial leading to the judgment of conviction;
b. DNA testing will provide exculpatory evidence;' 0 5
2. The testing requested employs a scientific method generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community;
10 6
3. The testing has the scientific potential to produce non-cumulative
evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence; 0
7
4. The identity of the perpetrator of the crime was, or should have
been, a significant issue in the case;108
5. The motion is not made solely for the purpose of delay.'0 9
Although these criteria provide the basic framework around which all
the statutes are structured, there is still a great deal of variation. For
example, in addition to the "reasonable probability" requirement,
Louisiana's statute dictates that there must be "an articulable doubt based
on competent evidence ... as to the guilt of the petitioner."'' 0 This
statutory language seems to shift the burden slightly, requiring that the
petitioner's guilt be uncertain before the question of DNA testing is raised.
By contrast, Nebraska lessens the petitioner's burden by eliminating the
requirement that the identity of the perpetrator was a significant issue in the
case. III
Depending on the state, there is also variation in the language of the
"reasonable probability" requirement, which mandates that the testing be
"reasonably probable" to have influenced the verdict or demonstrated the
petitioner's actual innocence. In Illinois, for example, the evidence must
simply be "materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence even though the results may not completely exonerate the
defendant.""' 2 The material relevance requirement is a lower evidentiary
'o5 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405.
106 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2006).
107 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-301-302 (2006).
108 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2006).
109 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.
I0 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4 (2006).
11 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4119-4122 (2006).
112 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3 (2006).
(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that...
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standard than that of reasonable probability. In a state like Illinois with a
material relevance standard in place, DNA testing that reveals the presence
of DNA from someone other than the petitioner, or DNA in addition to that
of the petitioner, would be admissible as being materially relevant.
However, such evidence probably would not meet the "reasonable
probability" of establishing innocence requirement. Hence, in a state such
as Louisiana, the post-conviction testing results might have little impact on
the petitioner's case. In yet another evidentiary permutation, some states
require both that the evidence be materially relevant to the petitioner's
identity and create a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
petitioner's case would have been altered." 3 Ultimately, the crux of these
statutes is the need for the court to determine whether or not the test is
likely to prove that the petitioner is innocent. The same subjectivity of
determination that plagued the innocence projects' screening processes
exists in this statutory language.
The problem of the standards' subjectivity has been barely ameliorated
by courts' interpretation of the statutes' plain language." 4  As with the
statutory language discussed above, the primary difference in courts'
reasoning seems to be based on the determination of whether "that evidence
would be 'likely' to produce a different verdict at trial, or that the evidence
is potentially exculpatory."'" 15 Even in states such as South Dakota, where
(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that
such evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material
aspect.
(c) The trial court shall allow the testing upon a determination that:
(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence even though the
results may not completely exonerate the defendant;
(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community.
Id.
113 See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1-19 (2006).
114 See below discussion and accompanying notes 115-123.
115 Christian, supra note 69, at 1213 ("Aside from the similarities cited by the Kansas
court, there does appear to be some difference between the states regarding the significance a
court should attach to a DNA testing result that shows the defendant's DNA does not match
the DNA sample found at the crime scene. In Pennsylvania, the standard appears more
rigorous as DNA evidence must 'definitely establish [the] Appellant's innocence.' This
language may suggest that Pennsylvania courts will require a heightened showing from
defendants before post-conviction testing will be available. A New York defendant may
stand a better chance than a Pennsylvania defendant in receiving DNA testing, because the
New York statute requires that the defendant show only that there is 'reasonable probability'
that test results would produce a verdict favorable to him, instead of showing that the DNA
evidence would 'definitively establish' his innocence. At the least, the varying language
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the court has attempted to establish a three-part test or guideline, the test
does not go beyond the language incorporated into the statute. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota only recently articulated its standard for
when post-conviction DNA testing may take place.1 6 The first part of the
court's test required that any DNA evidence and test results must meet the
standard for scientific reliability established by the United States Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' 7 The second part
of the test required the defendants to show that favorable test results would
"most likely produce an acquittal in a new trial."" 8 The third part of the
test stated that testing should not be permitted if it forced an unreasonable
burden upon the state." 9
As the Kansas Court of Appeals in Mebane v. State' 20 recognized,
"tests developed by the states share some similarities: testing is usually
permitted where the crime involved only one perpetrator and the
prosecution's evidence was weak or at least open to reasonable doubt."
21
Essentially, the lone pragmatic guideline that emerges from the common
law is that cases that involve multiple perpetrators in which it is unclear that
the petitioner's DNA was deposited at the scene of the crime do not rise to
the necessary standard of proof.122  However, the evaluation of the
weakness of the State's case and the reasonable probability of the
petitioner's guilt or innocence being established by the evidence are still left
to the subjective determination of the trial court.123
used in the statutes and in the common law demonstrates that a defendant's right to DNA
testing is not absolute and that the language states choose in setting these standards plays a
critical role in a defendant's ability to prove his innocence.") (internal citations omitted).
116 Id. at 1210 (discussing Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1999)).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1211 (citation omitted).
"l Id. at 1211-12 (citing Jenner, 590 N.W.2d at 472).
120 902 P.2d 494, 497 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
121 Christian, supra note 69, at 1212-13 (discussing Mebane, 902 P.2d 494) ("Other
states, when deciding whether to grant a prisoner access to DNA testing, also expressed that
DNA post-conviction testing was more suitable where certain fact patterns existed, such as
where there was a single perpetrator and other evidence presented at trial was doubted. See
Jenner, 590 N.W.2d at 472 (stating that post-conviction testing is 'most suitable' where 'the
identity of a single perpetrator is at issue'); In re Washpon v. N.Y. State Dist. Attorney, 625
N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (using the New York standard of reasonable
probability and indicating that there were not multiple assailants and that DNA tests would
be significant because the victim said she had not had sexual relations with anyone else the
night of the rape); Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. App. 1992) (declaring that
DNA testing should be used 'when the State's proofs are weak, [and] when the record
supports at least a reasonable doubt of guilt') (citation omitted).").
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1213.
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D. FEDERAL STATUTORY SCREENING PROVISIONS
Although this Comment focuses on state-based solutions to the post-
conviction testing problem, some mention should be made of the federally
devised methods of petition screening. As mentioned in Section II of this
Comment, the JFAA was recently signed into law by Congress. 124  The
JFAA provides increased fiscal incentives for states to create post-
conviction DNA testing programs, 125 and was signed into law on October
30, 2004. Incorporated into the JFAA is the Innocence Protection Act,
another piece of congressional legislation which, among other things, grants
any inmate convicted of a federal crime the right to petition a federal court
for DNA testing to support a claim of innocence. An inmate seeking testing
must show that evidence subject to DNA testing and relating to the crime
exists.126  Either the evidence must not yet have been tested, or the
petitioner must be seeking a new or improved type of testing, which could
"resolve an issue not resolved by previous testing."'' 27 The court will grant
the petitioner's motion if it determines that the testing can produce "new,
non-cumulative evidence" that is material to the petitioner's innocence.
28
These provisions are essentially indistinguishable from those of the state
statutes, and do little to illuminate the means by which the court may
evaluate the probable results of the post-conviction testing. 1
29
124 See supra note 67.
125 The JFAA provides:
Bonus Grants to States to Ensure Consideration of Legitimate Claims of Actual Innocence
(Section 413). This section reserves these program grant funds for states that: (1) make post-
conviction DNA testing available to any person convicted of a State crime; (2) allow post-
conviction relief if such testing excludes the defendants; and (3) preserve evidence in relation to
State cases.
See Memorandum from Sarah Tofte, supra note 67, at 2.
Additionally, the Kirk Bloodsworth Actual Innocence Grant Program authorizes five
million dollars per year for five years to provide grants to states for post-conviction DNA
testing. Id.
126 Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 2291(d)(l)(D) (2001).
127 Id. § 2291(d)(1)(B).
128 Id. § 2291(d)(1)(D).
129 Although a fairly wide range of evidentiary criteria are incorporated both into
common law and statutory standards for petition evaluation, none of these standards has
altered the fundamental necessity of a highly subjective evaluation of each individual's case.
More effective petition evaluation standards could potentially reduce the number of petitions
granted that ultimately affirm the guilt of the petitioner, which waste public resources and
reduce the speed with which the petitions of the truly innocent may be evaluated.
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IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING PETITIONS
The statutory schemes handling screening petitions vary enormously in
precision, specificity, and comprehensiveness. While it would not provide
a perfect solution in and of itself, a more uniform and rigorous screening
process could make major advances towards preventing the problem of
frivolous petitioning. The outline for one such scheme has already been
researched and described at length in a report issued by the National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. 1
30
In its 1999 report, the Commission laid out a system of categorization
of the cases in which a request for post-conviction DNA testing had been
made.13 1 Category 1 includes:
cases in which both the prosecutor and defense counsel concur on the need for DNA
testing. In such a case, if the parties cooperate, it should be possible to make the
necessary arrangements without recourse to a court and without demanding payment
for DNA testing when the inmate is indigent. 
132
Category 2 pertains to those instances in which
exclusionary test results will not be determinative of innocence, although they may
help an inmate obtain a new trial, a pardon, commutation, or clemency. There also
are cases in which the prosecutor and defense counsel cannot agree on whether an
exclusion would amount to a demonstration of innocence, would establish reasonable
doubt of guilt, or would merely constitute helpful evidence.
133
The report suggests that Category 2 cases would have to be decided with
"the assistance of a judicial officer ... to determine whether, and under
what conditions, testing should be conducted."' 134  In other words, the
decision to perform a DNA test would be a subjective evaluation by the
court.
Category 3 contains cases in which there is biological evidence, but
because of the present state of evidence or technology, testing will be
inconclusive and so should not be granted by the court. 135  Category 4
includes cases in which it is impossible to conduct testing because the crime
scene samples were never collected, were destroyed, cannot be found
despite the best efforts of the State, or were "preserved in such a way that
130 See POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 3.
113 Id. at 3-4.
134 Id. at 3.
131 Id. at 5.
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[they] cannot be tested."'136 Category 5 contains cases in which the claim of
innocence is clearly false; for example, in a case in which the trial transcript
"discloses ... evidence that makes the petitioner's claim meaningless, as in
a burglary conviction where petitioner was apprehended at the scene of the
crime."
,137
These categories provide more concrete, or at least more explicit,
differentiation between the cases for post-conviction testing than do most of
the state statutes. For example, the NEIP has been able to create a policy of
only taking on cases that fall within Categories 1 and 2.138 While state
statutes may not have specifically referenced a system of categories, these
categories clearly inform the statutory language by invoking an ultimate
reliance on the subjective and sometimes inaccurate evaluation of evidence
by the court, which can result in granting testing to guilty petitioners and
refusing testing to those who may be innocent. 139 An attempt to render the
court's screening process more rigorous by incorporating this category
system into state statutory formulations could provide clearer guidance to
the courts. However, most of the cases that would be questionable or
problematic would fit into Category 2. As a result, these cases would place
the onus of subjective evidentiary evaluation on the shoulders of the court,
which would do nothing to advance the goal of clearer guidelines. The
implementation of the category system would merely shift the responsibility
for this gut instinct evaluation from individual prosecutors or innocence
project agents to a judge.
Despite these potential difficulties, there are a few possible alternatives
for making the evidentiary standards imposed by statutes more rigorous.
First, while the category system would not provide a perfect solution, it
would give courts some simple ground rules. Cases in which there is
biological evidence available that has never been subjected to DNA testing
should be granted testing. Also, cases previously subject to testing through
procedures now technologically outdated and which lack other
incontrovertible evidence of guilt, such as the burglar's apprehension at the
scene of the crime, should be granted testing as Category 1 cases. Finally,
under the tests articulated in the NEIP guidelines, cases in which a sample
136 Id. at 6.
137 id.
138 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79.
139 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4 (2006) (providing that the court has the
responsibility to determine whether a "reasonable probability" exists that the test will make
the petitioner's guilt more or less likely).
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of biological evidence is too small to yield accurate results should not be
granted testing.
140
For those cases that belong in Category 2, the New Jersey statutory
formulation would go the furthest in establishing a bright line evidentiary
standard that might ameliorate the problem of arbitrary, subjective
determination of which petitions have merit and which do not. Under the
New Jersey model, the court would require the availability of biological
evidence and the reasonable probability of the probative value of testing.
1 41
The New Jersey model would also require a demonstration that the identity
of the defendant was a significant issue at trial, a prima facie showing that
the evidence sought to be tested is material to the issue of the convicted
person's identity, and finally, that the motion not be made purely for the
sake of delay.1 42  A statute that incorporated the category system of
analysis, the evidentiary requirements described in the New Jersey
statute, 143 and a prohibition on the advancing of a motion purely for the
sake of delay1 44 would better assist courts in conducting case by case
evaluations.
However, exclusive reliance on a solution targeted at reforming the
application screening process presents a number of problems, rendering
necessary a more comprehensive solution in addition to the incorporation of
these statutory requirements. First, innocence projects can devote
individual attention, even if it is the attention of a law student rather than an
attorney, to conducting witness interviews and personally speaking with the
defendant. State criminal justice systems are already so intensely resource
deprived that no statutory revision can create the kind of resources that the
government would need in order to screen with that sort of thoroughness. 1
45
140 Inconclusive test results are often the product of insufficiently large DNA samples.
Telephone Interview with Robert Hovey, supra note 17. Each strand of DNA contains
thirteen loci, which are the identifying markers that render DNA effective identification
tools. Id. If a DNA sample is too small, then it may only have one or two discernable loci,
which would be analogous to having one digit of a six digit license plate. Id. The single
digit of the license plate would, if entered into a database of state license plate numbers,
bring up thousands of "matches." Id. Similarly, if only two of the strand's thirteen loci are
identifiable, the evidence is essentially useless for purposes of identifying a single individual
as the source of the DNA. Id.
141 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32A (West 2006).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 However, it is important to note that the prohibition on motions for the sake of delay
is not tied to any sanction. The "delay" element of the statute merely provides grounds on
which the court may base its refusal to grant the motion, but does not penalize the individual
filing the petition.
145 John B. Oakly, Legislating Federal Crime and Its Consequences: The Myth of Cost-
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Second, subjectivity of evaluation may very well be an inescapable
element of the evaluation process for post-conviction testing petitions.
While the proposal described above might provide some resolution to this
problem as it arises during the screening process, eliminating the
subjectivity of evidentiary standards is impossible to achieve. Some of the
generalities of the standards employed by prosecutors' offices can probably
be explained by a lack of resources, but the subjectivity may in large part be
an inherent part of the endeavor. The fact that the common law, state
statutes, innocence projects, and state prosecutors have all failed to create a
precise system for determining who should or should not be granted a test
indicates very strongly that such a system is not possible. As Medwed's
description of the importance of instinct and experience in evaluating a case
indicates, the merit of an individual petitioner's application is peculiar to
the details and circumstances of that particular case.146 An attempt to create
a uniform standard more precise than the "reasonable probability"'' 47 that
evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial would require that
the facts of each case in question be uniform. Even the New Jersey statute,
with eight criteria for evidentiary evaluation, ultimately hinges on the
reasonable probability that results will be favorable to the defendant. 48 The
most any attempt to reform the screening process could accomplish would
be to narrow the range of cases in which tests could be granted, but even
that attempt would not eliminate the need for subjective evidentiary
evaluation.
Third, a more stringent application process carries the risk of failing to
exonerate an innocent person who cannot meet a heavier evidentiary
burden. As Medwed has observed,
Too rigid a line between inmate requests that qualify for consideration and those that
are immediately ousted would fail to account for the subjectivity inherent in the case
selection process and the fact that innocence cases are often messy and ill-suited to
categorization. When it comes down to it, intake criteria are useful guides but should
not be taken as gospel; any project would be hard-pressed to abandon a convincing
case of innocence. Ultimately, the deft screener must be mindful that valid claims
Free Jurisdictional Reallocation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 52, 62 (1996)
("State courts are failing in the face of violent crime not for lack of competence but for lack
of resources. Dissatisfaction with the administration of the criminal justice system by state
courts is attributable to the inability of local taxation systems to fund state courts and prison
systems adequately.").
146 See Medwed, supra note 3, at 1127.
147 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4 (2006).
148 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32A.
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may fall outside the scope of the project and that accommodations should sometimes
be made .... 149
The phrase "reasonable probability"'' 50 so often invoked in state statutes
provides the necessary flexibility to enable courts to create exceptions and
weigh the evidence in each case. The elimination of that flexibility could,
by creating the risk of eliminating actually innocent petitioners, subvert the
purpose of having post-conviction DNA testing in the first place.
Fourth, even if a more rigorous screening process could be effectuated
without creating the risk of barring innocent petitioners from receiving a
test, it would not necessarily reduce the number of applications that flood
the offices of innocence projects and court clerks, nor would it avoid the
crowding of prosecutors' desks. Instead, it would simply reduce the
number of those petitioners who are ultimately granted tests. In order to be
effective, a proposal to change the system of granting post-conviction
testing must deter guilty petitioners from seeking testing in the first place
while not discouraging innocent petitioners.
V. PAYMENT FOR TESTING
In cases involving biological evidence, there are expenses associated
with identifying the availability of biological material, getting approval to
conduct testing, and the costs of testing itself.15' Also, "while some
jurisdictions bear those costs eventually, in many, the incarcerated
individual must often 'front' the costs for the tests or have counsel do
so. ''1" Of the thirty-nine states with statutes in place to provide testing,
only Maryland, Missouri, and Utah make the cost of testing contingent on
whether the test confirms the petitioner's guilt.'53 If the results of the DNA
testing confirm the person's guilt, then the person is liable for any
reasonable costs incurred when conducting the DNA test, including but not
limited to the cost of the test.1 54 The thirty-six remaining states place the
onus of payment on solvent petitioners or, in the case of indigent
petitioners, on the state. 55 This formulation inverts the logical incentive
structure of DNA retesting petitions. Rather than punishing petitioners who
149 Medwed, supra note 3, at 1113.
15o See Christian, supra note 69, at 1213.
151 Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects: An Initial Primer, 70
UMKC L. REV. 921, 925 n.19 (2002).
152 Id.
153 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21.
154 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301 (2006).
155 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21.
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are solvent by requiring them to pay for the tests, states could use payment
for procedural and testing costs as a means of penalizing defendants who
seek tests that ultimately confirm their guilt.
156
The NEIP already recognizes the value of payment as another means
of screening petitions. 157  Even after a client's application has been
reviewed by an attorney and a law student and has passed the screening of
the evaluation committee, the NEIP still requires that the petitioner provide
some of the funding for the test. 158  In part, this requirement 159 exists
because the NEIP sends the biological evidence from its cases to
independent, rather than state, laboratories, and so state funding is not
available.' 60 But, the requirement also provides an additional filter, namely




There are at least three objections to requiring that petitioners pay for
testing. The first is that in some cases, it may be physically impossible for a
petitioner to fund the test. Given the expense of DNA testing, which may
run from $2,500 to $5,000 for a single test,162 requiring payment could
prove cost-prohibitive for indigent petitioners, and so such a measure would
unfairly disfavor these petitioners. As a result, insolvent petitioners who
might very well be innocent could be denied testing purely because they
could not pay for it. This payment provision would make solvency, rather
than the likeliness of the innocence of the petitioner, the determining factor
in the granting of a testing petition. A requirement of advance payment
could also jeopardize the exoneration of innocent petitioners simply
because those petitioners may also be indigent, and therefore unable to pay.
Utah answered this objection by making payment retroactive-only in the
event of a guilt-confirming test must a petitioner pay the testing costs.
163
While Utah's scheme avoids the problem of barring the access of the
156 As discussed in Section IV, supra, the inescapable problem with requiring insolvent
petitioners to pay is that they are, by definition, insolvent, and are therefore incapable of
paying.
157 Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79.
158 The remainder of the funding comes from private donor or law firm contributions. Id.
159 See Yankiver Suni, supra note 151, at 925 ("Note that, since this [requiring the client
to pay for the cost of testing] is an 'expense of litigation,' doing so does not run afoul of
Model Rule 1.8(e). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1983) (prohibiting
provision of 'financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation' except for advancing court costs and expenses of litigation).").
160 Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79.
161 Id.
162 Teresa Johnson, Orange County's Innocence Project, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Dec.
18, 2001, at 19.
163 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(8) (2006).
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innocent but poor, it does nothing to resolve the problem of indigent
petitioners who, guilty or not, are unable to pay for the test retroactively.
Second, there may be constitutional objections to such a requirement.
In other contexts, such as the pre-trial funding of potentially exculpatory
testing, requiring payment from petitioners violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process requirements. In Ake v. Oklahoma,'64 the
Supreme Court reasoned that "an indigent defendant had a due process right
to the service of a psychiatric expert when the expert's testimony would be
'a significant factor in [the] defense. ' '"1 65 The Court further held because
"the defendant might have a reasonable chance of success" to prove his
innocence with the testimony of a psychiatric witness, "in such a
circumstance, where the potential accuracy of the jury's determination is so
dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual and the
State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc
must yield."'166 The major distinction here is that the Ake holding applies to
the pre-trial, rather than post-conviction, funding of potentially exculpatory
evidence.167 Similarly, Little v. Streater 68 "has relevance to the payment
issue because it recognizes the constitutional significance of a technological
'64 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
165 Id. at 82-83.
166 Id. at 83.
167 See POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21, at 11 ("A great deal of case law
exists on the subject of a petitioner's right to biological evidence under the Brady v.
Maryland precedent. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a
constitutional right at or before trial to be informed of exculpatory evidence in the hands of
the State. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A number of courts have extended Brady to requests for
DNA testing even when the request is made after trial and even though it is potentially
exculpatory evidence that is being sought. In Arizona v. Youngblood, the petitioner claimed
that his conviction should be vacated because the State before trial had destroyed rectal
swabs containing sperm which could have demonstrated his innocence if subjected to
serological testing. 488 U.S. 51 (1988). Although the Supreme Court found that the
conviction would not be overturned without proof that the swabs were destroyed in bad faith,
nothing in the opinion suggests that petitioner would not have been entitled to testing if the
swabs now existed. These Supreme Court decisions provide an avenue for access to testing
even when no formal discovery procedures exist as part of the post-conviction statutory
scheme in that jurisdiction."). The Brady analysis has been used as a basis for the
constitutional right of petitioners to test biological evidence after conviction; it has never
been extended to a constitutional right to state funding for such testing. See also Sewell v.
State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("Advances in technology may yield
potential for exculpation where none previously existed. The primary goals of the court
when confronted with a request for the use of a particular discovery device are the
facilitation of the administration of justice and the promotion of the orderly ascertainment of
truth.").
168 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
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advance that can definitively alter fact determinations."' 69  In Little, the
Court held that a man being sued in a paternity action had a right to state
funding for a paternity test because, "unlike other evidence that may be
susceptible to varying interpretation or disparagement, blood test results, if
obtained under proper conditions by qualified experts, are difficult to
refute."' 170 Like paternity tests, DNA tests can provide the strongest and
most persuasive scientific evidence currently available.'17 Again, however,
the pre-trial versus post-conviction distinction applies; paternity testing
does not occur in the post-conviction context, and so Little's finding in
favor of state-funded paternity testing may not provide a constitutional
basis for funding post-conviction testing. As of yet, no court has answered
the question of whether a petitioner, indigent or otherwise, has a due
process right to state funding of post-conviction DNA tests.
Finally, such a requirement may not even be an effective deterrent.
Despite its mandate that petitioners advance at least part of the costs of the
tests, the NEIP has still handled a significant number 172 of cases in which
the guilt of the petitioners was confirmed by the test. The fact that a
significant number of the NEIP's clients have their guilt confirmed by
testing when they have been required to front the costs indicates that
payment is clearly not a significant deterrent to the guilty seeking testing.
Twenty-five hundred dollars may seem like a relatively insignificant
potential cost if a petitioner believes that she has even the slightest chance
of obtaining freedom, even if only due to a technical error in the testing.
Requiring the petitioner to pay necessarily relies on negotiating the
monetary value of liberty, and a person serving a forty-five year sentence
may very well consider money far less valuable than an overturned
conviction. The good time penalty scheme proposed below attempts to
avoid this problem by dealing in the currency of liberty, using freedom as
the basis for the testing petition incentive structure.
VI. GOOD TIME PENALTIES
All fifty states have statutes providing for a system of good time
credits, based on the concept that inmates may be rewarded for their good
169 POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING, supra note 21, at 18 (discussing Little, 452 U.S. 1).
170 Id. (citing Little, 452 U.S. at 14).
17l See supra Section II.
172 Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79 (Chunias stated that "under five" of
the cases dealt with by the NEIP have resulted in confirmations of guilt. While this figure
may not seem like a significant number, it becomes more significant when considered in
light of the fact that only six cases of the NEIP have resulted in exoneration.).
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behavior in prison by a reduction in their sentences."7 3 Good conduct can
include a variety of things, such as participating in educational, substance
abuse, or counseling programs in prison or complying with prison
regulations. 174  The reduction in sentence time is governed by a set
schedule. Some states base the amount of credit granted in proportion to
the time served and the conduct for which the prisoner is being rewarded.
For example, in Virginia, "consideration for Class I credit shall be given to
persons who perform in assignments requiring a high degree of trust, extra
long hours or specialized skills."'175 Class I carries the most favorable ratio
of time served to credit given, "at a rate of thirty days credit for each thirty
days served," and is "reserved for persons whose initiative, conduct and
performance in their assignments are exemplary."' 176 Class II, by contrast,
provides credit "at a rate of twenty days credit for each thirty days served"
and is allotted to "persons whose initiative, conduct and performance in
their assignments are satisfactory" and "persons who require moderate
supervision in their assignments and whose assignments require
responsibility in the care and maintenance of property."
1 77
Other states eliminate the evaluation of the conduct for which the
prisoner is being rewarded by instead measuring the allotment of sentencing
credit in proportion to the time served. 78 Another version of the good time
statutes grants time in proportion to both the time served and the type of
offense for which the prisoner was incarcerated. For example, in the State
of Washington, an inmate convicted of a Class A felony may not be given
good time credit in an amount that exceeds 15% of the total sentence, while
those convicted of lesser crimes may be credited up to a third of the total
sentence. 179
In addition to providing a scheme under which good time sentencing
may be provided, state statutes also describe grounds for the revocation of
good time credit. Offenses resulting in the forfeiture of good time credits
range in severity from escape or battery of a correctional officer to the
failure to report to an educational program. 180  Some states place the
responsibility for promulgating specific guidelines governing forfeiture of
171 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-201 (2006). For a detailed discussion of various
states' approaches to good time penalties, see James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison
Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217 (1982).
174 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 173.
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-200.
176 id.
177 id.
178 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4381 (2006).
179 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.151 (2006).
180 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4 (2006).
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good time credits in the hands of the Department of Corrections. Nevada's
forfeiture statute, for example, says only that "[t]he [Parole] Board shall
adopt regulations governing the award, forfeiture and restoration of credits
pursuant to this section."'
81
Of the thirty-nine states with post-conviction DNA testing statutes in
place, only one specifically penalizes petitioners whose test results confirm
their guilt-Missouri. 82  Missouri applies the statute used to punish
frivolous suits to petitioners implicated by the results of a post-conviction
DNA test. Under Missouri law,
If the results of the DNA testing confirm the person's guilt, then the person filing for
DNA testing under section 547.035, RSMo, shall:
(1) Be liable for any reasonable costs incurred when conducting the DNA test,
including but not limited to the cost of the test. Such costs shall be determined by
the court and shall be included in the findings of fact and conclusions of law made
by the court; and
(2) Be sanctioned under the provisions of section 217.262, RSMo [statute
punishing frivolous suits]. 1
83
Although twelve other states have legislation in place designed to
sanction prisoners for the filing of frivolous actions with the courts, none of
them have an explicit statutory provision for sanctioning inmates implicated
by post-conviction DNA testing. 84 Missouri's frivolous suit statute leaves
181 NEV. REv. STAT. § 209.446(5) (2006).
182 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 650.058(1)-(2) (2006).
183 Id. § 650.058(2).
184 Lynn Branham, Of Mice and Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Extending Prisoners'
Confinement for Filing Frivolous Lawsuits, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1081 nn.69-70 (2002);
see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8805 (2006) (authorizing the forfeiture of good time credits for
filing a factually frivolous action or a legally frivolous action when a pro se plaintiff, acting
with "due diligence," should have found "well settled law" confirming a claim's
frivolousness); FLA. STAT. § 944.28(2)(a) (2006) (authorizing forfeiture for bringing a
frivolous claim, lawsuit, or appeal); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(d) (2006) (requiring
prison officials to hold a disciplinary hearing to revoke good conduct credits when a court
found a prisoner's complaint filed against the state or state officials to be frivolous); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 197.045(5)(a) (West 2006) (requiring the Department of Corrections to
develop regulations defining the amount of good time credits to be forfeited for filing a
factually frivolous action and specifying the effect of such a filing on the prisoner's future
ability to earn such credits); MINN. STAT. § 244.035(b) (2006) (requiring the Department of
Corrections to develop sanctions, which may include the loss of good time credits, for filing
a frivolous claim); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-138(3) (West 2006) (requiring the forfeiture of
accrued good time credits upon receipt of a final court order dismissing a prisoner's lawsuit
as frivolous or for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 803(1)(d) (McKinney 2006) (directing the withholding of good time allowances after
a judicial finding that a prisoner filed a frivolous claim or action); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 566(C)(3) (2006) (authorizing the revocation of "earned credits" if a judge finds that a
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the determination of a suit's frivolousness in the hands of the court, and
imposes good time credit deductions only after the court finds that the
offender has violated the statute. 18 While a hearing is appropriate and even
necessary for the sort of subjective determination of whether or not a
petitioner has "unreasonably expanded or delayed a judicial proceeding,"' 186
or "brought an action or claim with the court solely or primarily for delay or
harassment,"'1 87 such a hearing is totally unnecessary in the instance of
guilt-confirming DNA tests. The "false, frivolous or malicious"'1 88 nature of
the petition is self-evident-a petitioner filing a request for testing is
cognizant of his own guilt or innocence, and a guilty petitioner who solicits
the court for redress of his case does so knowing that the only way in which
a post-conviction test will benefit him is if there is some sort of error or
evidentiary problem and the test mistakenly indicates his innocence.
As thirty-eight of the thirty-nine state statutes now stand, the indigent,
guilty petitioner has nothing to lose by seeking a test. Even in those states
that require payment from solvent petitioners, the cost of seeking a test is
purely monetary, and the possible gain is invaluable. State statutory codes
should, by all means, adopt provision for post-conviction DNA testing. But
both those states with post-conviction statutes in place and those who have
yet to promulgate such laws should adopt a statute sanctioning guilty
petitioners by forfeiting their good time credit.
An obvious objection to this proposal is that it would have no
consequences for a petitioner who has accumulated no good time credit.
But although good time credit may have originally been conceived as a
system of reward, due to bureaucratic time and resource constraints,' 9
[T]ime credits have become automatic; individual decision-making goes only to the
question of forfeiture. Like many incentives for good behavior inside and outside of
cause of action was frivolous); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-300 (2006) (authorizing an
extension of the inmate's imprisonment term if the inmate has had three or more actions or
appeals dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness unless the prisoner faced an "imminent
danger" of "great bodily injury" when he or she filed the action or appeal); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-21-816 (2006) (requiring the forfeiture of good conduct credits upon the receipt
of a final court order dismissing a claim or lawsuit as frivolous if the prisoner previously
filed a frivolous or malicious claim or lawsuit); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 498.0045 (Vernon
2006) (requiring the forfeiture of good-conduct time upon receipt of a court order dismissing
a lawsuit as frivolous); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-1A-6 (2006) (authorizing the forfeiture of
good time credits when a court finds a civil action to be frivolous).
185 Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.262(1).
186 Id. § 217.262(l)(3).
7 Id. § 217.262(1)(2).
188 Id. § 217.262(1)(1).
189 Jacobs, supra note 173, at 218, 224.
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prison, rewards come to be seen as entitlements and their denial as punishment. Good
time, therefore, has come to be administered as a system of punishment.
190
Today, in fact, most prisons dole out good time credit in a lump sum at the
beginning of prisoner's sentence, and so revocation, not reward, is the
incentive structure of the good time credit system.'
9 1
Incorporating the good time credit incentive structure into the post-
conviction testing system would not require the breaking of new statutory
ground or the promulgation of heretofore unrecognized penal measures.
The infrastructure for penalizing guilty petitions is already in place; every
state that provides for post-conviction testing also has a system for
allocating and revoking good time credit. 92 This proposal' 93 requires only
that the two systems be integrated, and that the incentive structure of the
good time credits be applied to petitions for post-conviction DNA testing.
194
190 Id. at 225 ([States'] power to reduce a sentence mirrors their power to lengthen it; in
practice, good time is usually administered as a system of punishment rather than reward.).
191 Id.
192 Axelrad & Russo, supra note 21.
193 One possible objection to this plan is that it carries no disciplinary weight with
inmates who have not accumulated any good time credit. There are a few ways to address
this problem. One would be again to follow the Missouri model. Under Missouri law, the
sixty day penalty can either be deducted from a prisoner's good time credit or it can simply
be added to the existing sentence. Mo. REv. STAT. § 217.262(1). Another way of dealing
with the mechanism would be to add time to the sentence according to the same scale that
time is added. If a state has in place a system whereby thirty days are deducted for every
thirty days served with good behavior, then thirty days may be deducted for every thirty day
period from the time the petition was filed with the court until the time that the petition was
granted and the test results indicating guilt were filed.
194 A second objection to this proposal concerns those petitioners serving life without
parole, consecutive life sentences, or those who have been sentenced to death. For these
petitioners, good time credit will not carry the same weight as those serving finite sentences.
This objection certainly carries some weight. For example, of the 174 men assisted by the
Cardozo Innocence Project since its founding, 57 were sentenced to life without parole,
death, or multiple, consecutive life sentences. See The Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2007), for detailed descriptions of
these case profiles. While an in-depth analysis of the incentive structure in place in the penal
system for such prisoners is outside of the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that
even prisoners serving indefinite or capital sentences are subject to a system of rewards and
punishments, such as access to gym facilities, incarceration location, etc. The same
incentives currently in place to control the behavior of life without parole and death row
inmates could be applied to post-conviction testing petitioners serving such sentences. For
further discussion of privileges used to discipline life without parole and death row inmates,
see Julian H. Wright, Jr., "Life- Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of a
Life at All?, " 43 VAND. L. REv. 529, 564 (1990) ("While the life-without-parole inmate has
significantly less chance of normal release than other inmates, maximum security measures
already in place in most prisons can control inmate behavior so that LWOP inmates do not
pose a qualitatively different security threat than other prisoners. Measures such as loss of
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Good time credit carries a great deal of weight with prisoners, so its
allocation or revocation is a very effective disciplinary tool.'95 The
Supreme Court recognized as much in Wolff v. McDonnell,196 writing that
"[t]he deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable
importance. The State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and
we should not unrealistically discount its significance."' 197 Since such an
effective disciplinary tool already exists, it is only logical to apply it to
those petitioners whose unnecessary DNA tests torment the victims of their
crimes, waste already stretched resources, and thwart efforts of the
genuinely innocent to seek release.
VII. CONCLUSION
Innocence projects, courts, and prosecutors receive far more petitions
for testing than can be granted. 98 Even those petitioners who do succeed in
getting biological evidence subjected to DNA testing often wait for years to
achieve those results, 199 in part because guilty petitioners absorb an
enormous amount of the system's resources.00
privileges and isolation are useful in controlling the behavior of all types of inmates."); see
also Jim Stewart & Paul Lieberman, "What Is This New Sentence that Takes Away Parole?,"
11 STUDENT LAW. 14, 15 (1982).
195 See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
196 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
197 Id. at 561.
198 For example, the innocence project operated by Duquesne University's Cyril H.
Weicht Institute of Forensic Science and Law has received 350 inquiry letters from inmates
since August 2004. Telephone Interview with Maria Comas, Manager of Academic and
Student Servs., The Cyril H. Weicht Inst. of Forensic Sci. & Law, in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Oct. 13,
2005). The Institute is working towards its first exoneration this year. Id. After eliminating
those inquiries that do not meet certain basic requirements (such as being within the correct
jurisdiction), the NEIP handles two hundred inquiries per year, and "take far fewer than they
end up rejecting." Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79. The project has been in
existence since 2001, and has been involved with six exonerations. Id. Chunias estimates
that the project attorneys spend a total of 3,000-4,000 hours per year working with
petitioners. Id. To provide a frame of reference, a common billable hour requirement for
large law firms is 2,000 hours.
199 In states without statutory provision for post-conviction DNA testing, the process can
take a year, if not longer, from the filing of a petition to the return of the test results.
Interview with Jennifer Chunias, supra note 79. The time frame of the total application
process is even longer: Chunias estimates that it can take six months to a year and a half until
a candidate is even accepted by the project. Id.
200 Chunias personally counsels her clients that a test confirming his or her guilt may
have negative ramifications for that prisoner's chances at parole. Id. However, because
there are no absolute statutory requirements of the loss of good time credit or consultation
with a prisoner's parole board, that threat is abstract at best and meaningless at worst.
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A solution is necessary. The screening process is already highly
rigorous, and the subjectivity of evidentiary evaluation may be an
unavoidable element of the post-conviction DNA testing process.20  A
more selective screening process might eliminate potentially innocent
applicants and also does nothing to alleviate the burden of initial
screening.20 2 Even requiring advance payment for the test, a solution more
directly targeted at discouraging guilty petitioners from seeking testing,
presents, at best, an imperfect solution and might also risk compromising
the applications of actually innocent petitioners. 20 3 The good time forfeiture
method does not carry this risk. It uses the same currency with which guilty
men seeking post-conviction testing already gamble-freedom. As the
system now stands, a guilty man can only gain by filing a petition, and the
potential gain has such enormous value that not betting on the slim chance
of a test producing a faulty result is incomprehensible. If anything, it is
amazing that every inmate in the country has not yet sought post-conviction
DNA testing. The proposed solution to this problem is simple, just, and
would be effective. To refuse to implement it is to needlessly persecute
victims seeking resolution, to burden an overburdened system, and to
compromise the freedom of innocent people.
201 See supra Section III.
202 Id,
203 See supra Section IV.
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